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Abstract
We study some aspects of the emergence of lo´gos from xa´os on a
basal model of the universe using methods and techniques from algo-
rithmic information and Ramsey theories. Thereby an intrinsic and
unusual mixture of meaningful and spurious, emerging laws surfaces.
The spurious, emergent laws abound, they can be found almost every-
where. In accord with the ancient Greek theogony one could say that
lo´gos, the Gods and the laws of the universe, originate from “the void,”
or from xa´os, a picture which supports the unresolvable/irreducible
lawless hypothesis. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that
the “laws” discovered in science correspond merely to syntactical cor-
relations, are local and not universal.
1 Introduction
What if the universe, on the most fundamental layer, just consisted of num-
bers? This is a suspicion at least as old as the Pythagoreans. According
to Huffman’s entry in The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy [46], “. . . in
theMetaphysics, he [Aristotle] treats most Pythagoreans as adopting a main-
stream system in contrast to another group of Pythagoreans whose system
is based on the table of opposites . . . . The central thesis of the mainstream
system is stated in two basic ways: the Pythagoreans say that things are num-
bers or that they are made out of numbers. In his most extended account of
the system in Metaphysics 1.5, Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans were led
to this view by noticing more similarities between things and numbers than
between things and the elements, such as fire and water, adopted by earlier
thinkers.” Moreover, according to another contemporary review ([55], p. 14),
“according to Aristotle, the Pythagoreans do not place the objects of math-
ematics between the ideas and material things as Plato does, they say ‘that
things themselves are numbers’ and that ‘number is the matter of things as
well as the form of their modifications and permanent states’. As the princi-
ples of mathematics, numbers are the ‘principles of all existing things’.”
The importance of number, and more generally, of mathematics, for not
only describing but “being” the bricks of the universe was stressed by em-
inent physicists, like Schro¨dinger ([73, ], Chapter III). The introduction of
computing machinery creating virtual realities brought these issues to the
forefront [87, 88, 35, 82, 54, 85]. In a recent bold leap, Tegmark’s Math-
ematical Universe Hypothesis [80, 81] states that “the physical universe is
not merely described by mathematics, but is a mathematical structure”.
As a consequence, mathematical existence equals physical existence, and all
structures that exist mathematically (even in a non-constructive way) exist
physically as well.
How could things be numbers? A world “spanned” by numbers can be
represented by a single infinite (binary) sequence1, or, equivalently, a single
real number.
In what follows a number world will be modelled by a (binary) sequence.2
Our choice is not to operate with the more geometric-centred Ancient Greek
concept of number, which is essential for many continuous models of math-
ematical physics, but with an algorithmic one which is capable of giving a
global perspective of the universe. Adopting this framework is motivated by
Plato’s mathematical discussion, in Timaeus, of the relations between num-
1A sequence is infinite while a string is finite. A finite prefix of a sequence is then a
string.
2This physical-mathematical mapping assumption is essential for this paper.
2
bers and things, see [55], p. 14 and also [19], and it is adopted here as a
matter of hypothesis.
All entities encoded therein, including observers as well as measured ob-
jects, must be embedded in [82, 79]; that is, they must themselves be (formed
out of) numbers or symbols [7]. Non-numeric properties associated with such
a “world on a sequence” can arise by way of a structural, levelled hierarchy [3].
Epistemologically this can be perceived as “emergence3 of reality”, which
is the inverse of reductionism to some more fundamental, basic levels, involv-
ing explanations in terms of ever “smaller” entities: physical/universal/natural
laws—in particular, relational and probabilistic ones—arise as effective pat-
terns and structures “bottom-up” (rather than “top-down”).
Such concepts were quite popular in the fin de sie´cle Viennese physical
circles, so much so that they have been referred to as the Austrian Revolt
in Classical Mechanics [44] and Vienna Indeterminism [78]: stimulated by
the apparent indeterminacy manifesting in Rutherford’s asymptotic decay
law and its corroboration by Schweidler [75], Exner’s 1908 inaugural lec-
ture as Rector Magnificus included the suggestion that ([31, ], p. 18) “we
have to perceive all so-called exact laws as probabilistic which are not valid
with absolute certainty; but the more individual processes are involved the
higher their certainty”. Also Schro¨dinger’s inaugural lecture in Zu¨rich enti-
tled “What is a natural law?” adopted and promoted Exner’s ideas [71, 72],
well in accord with Born’s later inclinations [8]. Since then classical statisti-
cal physics, as well as radioactive decay processes and quantised systems have
operated under the presumption that the most fundamental layers of micro-
physical description are—both theoretically as well as phenomenologically
and empirically—consistent with irreducible indeterminism.
Later related ideas have been brought forward in the context of a lay-
ered structure of physical theories [3], emergent cognition—perceived as an
“emerging epiphenomenon” of neural activity; not unlike traffic jams they
arise from the movements of individual taxis [45] –as well as emergent com-
putation [33].
In what follows we shall, in a “Humean spirit” [47], study “laws” as pat-
terns/correlations in sequences using the concept of spurious correlations in
3“Emergence is a notorious philosophical term of art.” [61]. In this paper we will not
use the term in the sense of the philosophical emergency theory, but with the signification
given in physics [51]: “The term emergent is used to evoke collective behaviour of a large
number of microscopic constituents that is qualitatively different than the behaviours of the
individual constituents.”
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data, to be defined later. Two guiding theories will be applied: one is algo-
rithmic information theory, the other is Ramsey theory. The gist of these
two ways of looking at data is twofold: “all very long, even irregular” data
sequences contain “very large” (indeed, as long as you prefer) regular, com-
putable and thus, in physical terms, deterministic, subsequences. Secondly,
it is impossible and inevitable for any arbitrary data set not to contain a
variety of spurious correlations; that is, relational properties which could
physically be wrongly interpreted as laws “governing” that universe of data.
2 Physical/Universal/Natural Laws
The notion of law in natural sciences, or law of the universe [5, 24, 70, 58,
32, 60] has a long ambivalent history. It might not be overstated to claim
that the conjecture that there are laws of nature is the core to what sci-
ence is and how it was and is performed. Of course, one can refute this
view and this lawless hypothesis has been discussed by various authors,
see [4, 83, 18, 69, 19, 86, 57, 11]. Contemplating a lawful universe usu-
ally amounts to assuming that the laws of nature are objective, have always
existed and will exist, and they are written in the language of mathematics.
Taken this for granted is an assumption which raises many problems, some of
which will be discussed later. In this tradition science can be done in one way,
the Galileo-Newton one; but if there are no laws, we can be freed to pursue
other methodological options, some of which are not entirely unproblematic.
Continuing to enrich the fundamental Greek practice of scientific observation,
thinking and debating on different theoretical interpretations of phenomena
with other methods, like the experimental methods (since Galileo) and the
mathematical models (since Descartes and Newton) is obviously desirable.
A step in this direction is to incorporate robust data analytics as a scientific
method, see [66, 77, 74, 67]. However, suggestions to narrow down the scien-
tific methods to just a collection of “empirical evidences”, to advance purely
speculative theories (see [30] for physics) or to promote the “philosophy” ac-
cording to which correlation supersedes causation and theorising (see [17])
are dangerous.4
The laws governing “physis” (nature) and those under which human so-
cieties are ruled have often been conflated and postulated to be of the same
4See the Appendix A for a more formal discussion.
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origin. At the dawn of western civilisation Heraclitus held that lo´gos5 perme-
ates everything, an arrangement common to all things yet incomprehensible
to man ([25, 23] and [50]). However, there are crucial differences between
these laws. As Aristotle argued, a law is “by nature” if it is justified by
appeal to something other than an agreement or a decision; in contrast, the
laws human societies are ruled by are agreed upon in the Agora. While the
former laws have been considered “absolute”, the latter are clearly conven-
tional. For example, the laws of movement are natural in contrast with the
institutional structure of Greek democracy which is the result of human con-
sensus. In Rhetoric, I.13, Aristotle discusses also the compatibility between
the natural and the conventional laws. a characteristic of human justice,
in contrast to divine justice. Both these laws are different from the concept
of “natural law” developed in the Greek (Aristotle) as well as the Roman
(Cicero) philosophies. In this philosophical sense a “natural law” asserts
certain rights inherent by virtue of human nature. Endowed by nature—by
God or a transcendent source—such a law can be understood universally
through human reason [22]. Two typical laws of Aristotelian “physis” are:
(i) Nothing moves unless one pushes it (there must be a ‘mover’ in order to
move it). (ii) Because motion does exist, the above law implies that there
must be a self-moved mover, i.e., a ‘Prime Mover’. Finally, according to the
definition of “natural” found in the Nicomachean Ethics, V.7, God is both a
lawgiver for humans and the governor of nature, a view which was inherited
by Christianity.
3 Laws and Limit Constructions
The scientific revolution grounded the proposal of new laws of nature on ob-
servation and iterable experimentation; sometimes these types of laws were
simply guessed or invented, but nonetheless on the grounds of a “meaningful”
(physical, theoretical and practical) framework. For example, after several
experiments, some of which were just imagined, Galileo and others [28] pro-
posed the “law” of inertia. This law is a fundamental conservation principle,
the conservation of momentum, and is a limit principle since no physical body
actually moves at constant speed along an Euclidean line–a straight line with
no thickness. Yet, by extrapolating from his observations made on the object
5Lo´gos is the apparent antithesis of xa´os in Hesiod’s Theogony [43].
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of bodies as their friction was changed, Galileo was able to deduce the con-
cept of inertia, and closely analyse what circumstances affect this asymptotic
movement: friction and gravitation. Thus, by this scientific process of induc-
tion, deduction, extrapolation and abduction [64, 26, 49], an Aristotelian,
God given, absolute, notion of a law of “physis” was radically modified. The
advantage of this notion of physical law based on limit principles and sym-
metry is visible once Newton made the connection between falling apples
and planets: there is no need to be anyone pulling nor pushing the planets to
move them around. Indeed, Newton’s law of gravitation gives the trajectories
of any two bodies in inertial movement within a gravitational field, including
apples and planets. On the one hand it became possible to derive Kepler’s
trajectories and laws for one sun and one planet from Newton’s law, without
the need for a Prime Mover that is constantly pushing. On the other hand,
Newton realised that, with two or more planets, reciprocal interactions desta-
bilise the planets’ trajectories (which later would be recognised as a result of
chaotic non-linearity). He thus assumed the aid of occasional interventions of
God in order to assure the stability of the planetary system in secula seculo-
rum: God, through a few sapient touches, was the only guarantor of the long
term stability of the Solar System [53]. Poincare´ later confirmed mathemati-
cally this deep intuition of Newton on the asymptotic chaos within the Solar
System (see below for more discussion of this). We should note, however,
that this analysis only makes sense in the mathematical continua. Inertia is
conceived as a limit property; moreover, its understanding as a conservation
law (of momentum) alongside the conservation of energy, as a symmetry in
the equations (as a result of Noether’s theorems relating symmetries to con-
served quantities [59]), is based on continuous symmetries: they are invariant
with respect to continuous translations in space or time. A few years later,
Galileo, Boyle and Mariotte proposed another limit law: they traced the
isothermal hyperbolas of pressure and volume for perfect gases. Of course,
actual gases, as a result of friction, gravitation, inter-particle interactions,
etc., do not follow this peculiar conic section; yet its abstract, algebraicma
formulation and its geometric representation, allowed a uniform and general
understanding of the earliest law of thermodynamics. Principles referring to
inexistent ideal trajectories, at the external limit of phenomena, continued to
rule knowledge constructions in physics. As another example, let us consider
Boltzmann’s ergodic principle: In a perfect gas a particle stays in a region
of a given space for an amount of time proportional to the volume of that
region. Once again this is an asymptotic principle, as it uniformly holds only
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at the infinite limit in time. On these grounds, Boltzmann’s thermodynamic
integral that allows the deduction of the second law of thermodynamics (re-
garding the increase in entropy) is also formulated as a limit construction
(an integral): it holds only at the infinite limit of the number of particles in
the volume of gas. Can one prove, or at least corroborate, these asymptotic
principles? There is no way to put oneself or a measurement instrument at
these limit conditions and check for Euclidean straight lines, hyperbolas or
behaviour at the asymptotic limit in time. One may only try to falsify some
consequences [65]; yet, even in such cases the derivation itself may be wrong,
but not necessarily the principle. As has already been pointed out by many
philosophers, among them Hume, Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer, all we
can produce—and this is a crucial point—is scientific knowledge: we under-
stand a lot, but not everything, through these limit principles that unify all
movements, all gases, etc., as specific instances of inexistent movements and
gases. And, more importantly, as a result we can construct fantastic tools
and machines that work reasonably well – but not perfectly well, of course—
and have radically changed our lives. With these machines the westerners
dominated the world after the scientific revolution, a non trivial consequence
of their science and its “absolute” laws. We are typing, reading and ex-
changing data in networks of the latest of these inventions, an excellent, but
not perfect, instance of a limit machine–the Turing machine. One of the
limit principles of these machines is Turing’s distinction between hardware
and software and the identification between program with data that allows
abstract, mathematical styles of programming all the while (almost) disre-
garding their material realisation.
Another important consequence was the discovery of limits of computing,
specifically the incomputability of the halting problem, and more generally
the development of theoretical computer science [39].6 At the same time the
abstract character obscured the role played by physics in computing: because
of the separation between hardware and software, the role of hardware in
computation was largely ignored in theoretical computer science, arguably
delaying with a few decades the understanding and development of physics
of computation, reversible computing and quantum computing, [52, 34, 56].
6These limits can be mitigated from a practical point of view with various methods;
for example, the halting problem can be solved probabilistically with arbitrarily high
precision [16].
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4 Order within Disordered Sequences
In intuitive terms, Ramsey theory states that there exists a certain degree of
order in all sets/sequences/strings, regardless of their composition. Heuris-
tically speaking, this is so because it is impossible for a collection of data
not to have “spurious” correlations, that is, relational properties among its
constituents which are determined only by the size of the data. The simplest
example of such (spurious) correlation is given by the Dirichlet’s pigeonhole
principle stating that n pigeons sitting in m < n holes result in at least one
hole being filled with at least two pigeons. Or in a party of any six people,
some three of them are either mutually acquaintances, or complete strangers
to each other [38, 9].7 This seemingly obvious statements can be used to
demonstrate unexpected results; for example, the pigeonhole principle im-
plies that there are two people in Paris who have the same number of hairs
on their heads. The pigeonhole principle is true for at least two pigeons and
one whole; the party result needs at least six people. A common drawback of
both results is their non-effectivity: we know that two people in Paris have
the same number of hairs on their heads, but we don’t know who they are.
An important result in Ramsey theory is Van der Waerden theorem
(see [37]) which states that in every binary sequence at least one of the two
symbols must occur in arithmetical progressions of every length.8 The theo-
rem describes a set of arbitrary large strong correlations – in the sequence
x1x2 . . . xn . . . there exist arbitrary large k,N such that equidistant posi-
tions k, k + t, k + 2t, . . . k + Nt contain the same element (0 or 1), that is,
xk = xk+t = xk+2t, · · · = xk+Nt.
9 Crucial here is the fact that the property
holds true for every sequence, ordered or disordered.10 Are these correlations
“spurious”? According to Oxford Dictionary, spurious means “Not being
what it purports to be; false or fake. False, although seeming to be genuine.
Based on false ideas or ways of thinking.” The (dictionary) definition of the
word “spurious” is semantic, that is, it depends on an assumed theory: one
correlation can be spurious according to one theory, but meaningful with
respect to another one.
7In fact, there is a second trio who are either mutually acquainted or unacquainted [9].
8If we interpret 0 and 1 as colours, then the theorem says that in every binary sequence
there exist arbitrarily long monochromatic arithmetical progressions.
9Again, the proof is not constructive.
10The finite version of Van der Waerden theorem shows that the same phenomenon
appears in long enough strings. See more in [17].
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Can we give a definition of “spurious correlation” which is independent
of any theory? Following [17] a spurious correlation is defined in a very re-
strictive way as follows: a correlation is spurious if it appears in a randomly
generated string/sequence. Indeed, in the above sense a spurious correla-
tion is “meaningless” according to any reasonable interpretation because,
by construction, its values have been generated at “random”, as all data in
the sequence. As a consequence, such a correlation cannot provide reliable
information on future developments of any type of behaviour. Of course,
there are other reasons making a correlation spurious, even within a “non-
random” string/sequence. But, are there correlations as defined above? Van
der Waerden theorem proves that in every sequence there are spurious corre-
lations in the above sense – they can be said to “emerge”. Therefore, these
spurious correlations can also be re-interpreted as “emerging laws.” It is im-
portant to keep in mind that these “laws” are not properties of a particular
sequence,—indeed, they exist in all sequences as Van der Waerden theorem
proves. How do the spurious correlations manifest themselves in a number
world? From the finite version of Van der Waerden theorem, the more bits
of the sequence describing the number world we can observe, the longer are
the lengths of monochromatic arithmetical progressions. So, once there are
(sufficiently many) data, regardless of their intrinsic structure, “laws from
nowhere” (ex nihilo) emerge. In what follows we will work only with the
above definition of spurious correlation.
Are these spurious correlations just simple accidents or more customary
phenomena? We can answer this question by analysing the “sizes” of the
sets of random sequences/strings in which spurious correlations arise. As our
definition of spurious correlation is independent of any theory, in answering
the above questions we will use a model of randomness for sequences and
strings provided by algorithmic information theory [13, 27] which has the
same property.
First, how “large” is the set of random sequences? If we work with
Martin-Lo¨f random sequences11, then the answer is “almost all sequences”:
the probability of a sequence to be Martin-Lo¨f random is one.12 This means
11A Turing machine with a prefix-free domain is called self-delimiting. A (self-
delimiting) Turing machine which can simulate any other (self-delimiting) Turing machine
is called universal. A sequence is Martin-Lo¨f random if there exists a fixed constant such
that every finite prefix (string) of the sequence cannot be compressed by a self-delimiting
universal Turing machine by more than a constant [13].
12This holds true even constructively.
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that the probability that an arbitrary sequence does not have spurious corre-
lations is zero.13
Second, as human access to sequences is limited to their finite prefixes,
it is necessary to answer the same question for strings: what is the “size” of
“random” strings? Using the incompressibility criterion again [17], a string
x of length n is α-random if no Turing machine can produce x from an
input with less than n − α · n bits.14 The number of α-random strings x
of length n is larger than 2n (1− 2−α·n) + 1, and hence, with finitely many
exceptions, it outnumbers the number of binary strings of length n which
are not α-random.15 More interestingly, the probability that a string x of
length n is α-random is larger than 1−2−α·n+2−n, an expression which tends
exponentially to 1 as n tends to infinity. This means that the probability that
an arbitrary string does not have spurious correlations is as close to zero as
we wish provided that its length is large enough, that is, excluding finitely
many strings.
Furthermore, the increase of some types of spurious correlations, i.e., emer-
gent “laws”, can be quantified: Goodman’s inequality [36, 76] yields lower
bounds on how many spurious correlations are observed as a function of the
size of data. Conversely, Pawliuk recently suggested [63] that Goodman’s
inequality can be utilised for testing the (null) hypothesis that a dataset
is random: if the bounds are over-satisfied, the correlations might be not
spurious, and thus the dataset might not be stochastic. Can we distinguish
between meaningful laws and emerging “laws”? The answer seems to be
negative at least from a computational point of view.
5 The Emergence of Turing Complete (Uni-
versal) Computation
In view of the “quantification” of information content [20, 13], how could
complexity and structures such as universal computation, evolve even in prin-
ciple? The answer to this question is in the algorithmic information content
13Probability zero is not the same as impossibility: there exist infinitely many
sequences—like the computable ones—which contain no spurious correlations.
14The minimum length of an input a Turing machine needs to compute a string of
length n lies in the interval (0, n+ c), where c is a fixed constant. From this it follows that
α ∈ (0, 1).
15More precisely, when n ≥ 2/α.
10
(complexity) of the number world.
The proof of Turing completeness16 of the Game of Life provided by
Conway in ([6, ], Chapter 25, What Is Life?) is a useful method for exploring
how complex behaviour like Turing completeness can emerge from very simple
rules, in this case, the rules of cellular automata (see more in [68]). With
a universal Turing machine and all α-random strings one can generate all
strings [13].
Is this phenomenon also possible for sequences, that is, for number worlds?
The answer is affirmative. According to a theorem by Kucˇera-Ga´cs-Hertlinger
([13, ], p. 179), there effectively exists a process F—which is continuous com-
putable operator—which generates all sequences from the set of Martin-Lo¨f
random sequences: in other words, every sequence is the image from F of a
Martin-Lo¨f random sequence.
6 Is the World Number Computable?
Of course, there exist infinitely (countable) computable world numbers.
Can we decide whether the sequence describing a given world number
is computable? Answering this question is probably impossible both theo-
retically and empirically. However, we can answer a simpler variant of the
question: What is the probability that a world number is computable? If we
take as probability the Lebesgue measure [13], then the answer is zero.17
The above result shows that the probability that a world number can
be generated by an algorithm is zero. If we weaken the above requirement
and ask about the probability that there exists an algorithm which generates
infinitely many bits of a world number, then the answer remains the same:
this probability is nil. This result follows from a theorem in algorithmic
information theory saying that the complement of the above set—the set
of bi-immune sequences18 —has probability one [13]. A consequence of this
fact, corroborated by an extension of the Kochen-Specker theorem proving
value indefiniteness of quantum observables relative to rather weak physical
16A model of computation is Turing complete—sometimes called universal—if it can
simulate a universal Turing machine.
17Again, one should not think that this means that there are no computable world
numbers, see Section 6. The result follows from the fact that the computable sequences
form a countable set.
18 A sequence is bi-immune if its corresponding set of natural numbers nor its comple-
ment contain an infinite computably enumerable subset.
11
assumptions [2], is that with probability one a number world is produced by
repeatedly measuring of such a value indefinite observable.
7 Non-Uniform Evolution
Two examples of world numbers are particularly interesting: Champernowne
world number and Chaitin world number. A Champernowne world number
in base two is given by the sequence
C2 = 01000110110000010100111001011101110000 . . .
which consists in the concatenation of all binary strings enumerated in quasi-
lexicographical order [21].19 A a Chaitin world number is given by a Chaitin
ΩU number (or halting probability), that is the probability that the universal
self-delimiting Turing machine U halts [15]. Chaitin world numbers “hold
proofs” for almost all mathematical known results; such as as Fermat Last
Theorem (in the 400 initial bits), Goldbach’s conjecture, or important con-
jectures like Riemann Hypothesis (in the 2745 bits initial bits) and P vs. NP
(in the 6,495 initial bits; cf. [14]. Both world numbers are Borel normal in the
sense that every binary string x appears in these sequences infinitely many
times with the same frequency, namely 2−|x|, where |x| is the length of x.
In such a world every text—codified in binary—which was written and will
be ever written appears infinitely many times and with the same frequency,
which depends only on the length of the text. In particular, any correlation
appears in such a world infinitely many times. However, these worlds are also
very different: A Champernowne world number is computable, but a Chaitin
world number is highly incomputable because it is Martin-Lo¨f random. As
a consequence, while both number worlds have all possible correlations re-
peated infinitely many times, the status of those correlations are different:
in a Chaitin world number these correlations are spurious (because of its
randomness), but in a Champernowne world number they are not (because
its computability, hence highly non-randomness).
How an embedded observer would “feel” to live in such a world? This
is a deep question which needs more study. Here we will make only a few
simple remarks (see also [18]).
First, no observer or rational agent could decide in a finite time whether
they live in a Champernowne or Chaitin world. Second, any observer or
19In base 10, C10 = 12345678910111213141516 . . . .
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rational agent surviving, or at least recording experimental outcomes, a suf-
ficiently long time will see many of the previously discovered accepted “laws”
being refuted.
Third, suppose intrinsic observers embedded into a mathematical uni-
verse experience and “surf” these number worlds by their interactions with
them; that is, they perceive long successions of initial bits of their defining
infinite sequences. Assume now that these sequences are Champernowne or
Chaitin sequences. Because of the Borel normality of these sequences, the
strings surfed by observers are Borel normal as finite objects, that is, they
are distributed uniformly up to finite corrections [12]. How would intrinsic
observers experience such variations? In one scenario one may speculate that
intrinsically such “interim” periods of monotony may not count at all; that
is, these will not be operationally recognised as such: for an embedded ob-
server [82, 79], the world number will remain “dormant” while the number
world remains monotonous.
Another option, maybe even more speculative, is to assume that, as long
as the world number allows for a sufficiently wide variety of substrings, the
intrinsic phenomenology will, through emerging character of (self-) percep-
tion, “pick” its own segment or pieces (of numbers) from all the available
ones. Indeed, it might not matter at all for intrinsic perception whether, for
instance, the cycle time is altered (reduced, increased), or whether the lapse
of cycles is arbitrarily exchanged or even inverted: as long as there are still
“sufficient” patterns and number states emerging could “process” and “use,”
lawfulness and consciousness will always ensue [29].
8 Is the Universe Lawless?
In this section we add another argument—to many others [4, 83, 18, 69, 19,
86, 57, 11]—in favour of the hypothesis in the title.
There are uncountable infinite binary sequences, each of which could be
a (the) “true” simplest model of our universe. Among these candidates,
we have the set of Martin-Lo¨f random sequences, which will fit with the
hypothesis: this set is very large, because as we have already mentioned,
the probability that an infinite binary sequence is not Martin-Lo¨f random is
(constructively) zero. However, the complement of this set—which has then
probability zero—is not only infinite, but also uncountable and therefore
cannot be lightly discarded.
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The so-called physical/universal/natural “laws” deal with the infinity, on
one hand; but can be verified only on finitely many cases. What about the
situation when a “true model” is not a Martin-Lo¨f random sequence, possibly
a highly improbable computable one?
In order to be able to attempt to confirm the “laws” in this model we
have to surf the initial bits of the infinite sequence. How many bits can be
surfed? A possible bound from below is the number of atoms in the universe
which is believed to be less than Numberatoms = 10
82. What is then the
probability that an infinite sequence, thought as a model of our universe,
starts with an α-random string of length Numberatoms? In this set there
are infinitely many Martin-Lo¨f random sequences and a sequence is Martin-
Lo¨f random with probability one, see Section 6, but also infinitely many
computable sequences. The analysis in Section 4 shows that this probability
will be larger than
1− 2−α·10
82
+ 2−10
82
,
because this is the probability that an infinite binary sequence starts with
an α-random string of length Numberatoms. With this probability—which
is infinitesimally close to one—every choice for our model of our universe
starts with an α-random string; consequently, all patterns and correlations
which can be verified in this model are spurious!
Let us hasten to note that spurious does not mean wrong, not genuine,
useless. On the contrary, correlations can be, and many times are, interest-
ing, useful and give us insight about the working of the universe; they are,
however, local and not universal.
9 Conclusions
According to Heidegger [40], the most profound and foundational metaphysi-
cal issue is to think the existent as the existent (“das Seiende als das Seiende
denken”). Here the existent is metaphorically interpreted as an infinite se-
quence of bits, a Number World. Rather than answering the primary ques-
tion [41] of why there is existence rather than nothingness, this paper has
been mostly concerned with the formal consequences of existence under the
least amount of extra assumptions [48].
As it turns out, existence implies that an intrinsic and sophisticated mix-
ture of meaningful and (spurious) patterns—possibly interpreted as “laws”—
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can arise from xa´os. The emergent “laws” abound, they can be found almost
everywhere. The axioms in mathematics find their correspondents in the
“laws” of physics as a sort of “lo´gos” upon which the respective mathemati-
cal universe is “created by the formal system”. By analogy, our own universe
might be, possibly deceptively and hallucinatory, be perceived as based upon
such sorts of “laws” of physics. The results in Sections 4 and 8 have corrobo-
rated the Humeanism view, later promoted by Exner and to some extend by
the young Schro¨dinger, that at least some physical “laws” merely arise from
xa´os; a picture which is compatible with the unresolvable/irreducible lawless
hypothesis. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the “laws”
discovered in science correspond merely to syntactical correlations, are local
and not universal.
As in biological living systems, the dynamics described above is not a mat-
ter of stable or unstable equilibrium, but of far from equilibrium processes
which are “structurally stable”. This “duality” is supported in physics by the
hierarchical layers theory [3, 62]. The simultaneous structural stability and
non-conservative behaviour in biology, which is a blend of stability and insta-
bility is due to the coexistence of opposite properties such as order/disorder
and integration/differentiation [10].
Such an active and mindful (some might say self-delusional and projec-
tive) approach to order in and purpose of the universe may be interpreted
in accord with the ancient Greek theogony [43] by saying that lo´gos, the
Gods and the laws of the universe, originate from “the void,” or, in a less
certain interpretation, from xa´os. Very similar concepts were developed in
ancient China probably around the same time as Homerus and Hesiod: the
I Ching utilises relational properties of symbols from sophisticated stochas-
tic procedures providing inspiration, meaning and advice on what has been
understood as divine intent and the way the universe operates.
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A Causation and Correlation: Two Formal
Models
To understand better the difference between causation and correlation we
present two simple models. In the first model we have two hypotheses, x
and y which can true or false and we denote by x ≻ y the proposition “x
is a cause for y” and by C(x, y) the proposition “x and y are correlated”.
The logical representations of the new propositions are enumerated in the
following Table 1: Indeed, x ≻ y = 1 if x is true, then y is true, that is,
x = y = 1. Note that x ≻ y is a “more restrictive” operator than the logical
implication which is true also when 0 → y = 1, for every y ∈ {0, 1}. We
have C(x, y = 1) if and only if both x and y are either true or false, that is,
x = y. If follows that x ≻ y implies C(x, y) = 1, but the converse is false.
Table 1: Causation versus correlation: a logical model.
x y x ≻ y C(x, y)
0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
The second model is inspired by the Fechner-Machian identification of
causation with functional dependence [60, 42]: suppose that data is repre-
sented by two sets X and Y . If f : X → Y is a function from X to Y , then
we denote the graph of f by Gf = {(x, f(x)) ∈ X×Y | f(x) = y}. A relation
R between X and Y is a set R ⊆ X × Y . We say that x ∈ X is an f -cause
for y ∈ Y if f(x) = y and we write x ≻f y. The elements x, y are correlated
by the relation R, in writing, CR(x, y), if (x, y) ∈ R. Assume that Gf ⊂ R;
if x ≻f y, then CR(x, y) but the converse implication is not true.
Both models show that correlation is symmetric, but causation is not.
However, the models above do not reflect a crucial difference between cau-
sation and correlation: the former contributes to the understanding, in an
imperfect way, of the phenomenon, but the second is just a syntactical obser-
vation. Causation invites testing, revision, even abandonment; correlation is
static and without further analysis could be misleading, see [84, 1].
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